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Occupational licensing refers to a government-imposed 
regulation which requires an individual to obtain a license before 
engaging in a certain line of work.  Over the last several decades, 
occupational licensing regulations have expanded rapidly.  While 
some of these regulations can be justified as a form of consumer 
protection (as in the medical industry), many simply operate as 
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barriers to entry (as in the interior design industry).  
Furthermore, these regulations impose economic costs that fall 
disproportionately on those who are economically 
disadvantaged. 
Fortunately, bipartisan state legislative efforts have begun to 
make some progress in rolling back these regulations.  However, 
because legislative reform is often slow, the bearers of these 
burdensome regulations often seek redress through the court 
systems.  In a recent case, Ladd v. Real Estate Commission,1 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that certain licensing 
requirements violated the right to pursue one’s chosen 
occupation—a right it said was protected by the state’s natural 
rights clause enshrined in the Pennsylvania Constitution.  We 
believe that Ladd’s conclusion is correct in light of the historical 
understanding of these natural rights clauses.  Importantly, 
Pennsylvania is one of thirty-three states to have such a clause in 
its state constitution.  These natural rights clauses provide an 
easy anchor point by which to argue that unjustified occupational 
licensing unduly interferes with one’s right to pursue a chosen 
occupation and, consequently, interferes with the rights 
guaranteed by the state constitution.  Therefore, Ladd can serve 
as a powerful example of how to limit the breadth of occupational 
licensing through state court litigation in the majority of states. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Dream was perhaps first described by Alexis 
de Tocqueville in his book Democracy in America as “the charm 
of anticipated success,”2 but it is probably best understood as 
defined by early twentieth century historian James Truslow 
Adams.  He wrote in his book, Epic of America, “The American 
Dream, that dream of a land in which life should be better and 
richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each 
according to his ability or achievement.”3  The American Dream 
can be seen as the promise that, no matter who you are, you will 
have the opportunity to succeed through hard work and be more 
prosperous than your parents, and their parents before them. 
 
1. Ladd v. Real Estate Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2020). 
2. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 550 (Henry Reeve 
trans. 2002). 
3. JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 404 (1932). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/2
58 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  41.2 
Yet this promise is being broken more frequently.  
Intergenerational economic mobility—the percentage of children 
who earn more than their parents at the same age—has declined 
drastically since the 1940s when over 90% of children surpassed 
their parents’ earnings; now, for the first time, most children 
earn less than their parents did at the same age.4  This coincides 
with other worrying signs that the American Dream may be 
dying or at least is quite ill.  Income inequality has risen 39% 
since 1980.5  Real wage growth—wage growth adjusted for 
inflation—has largely stagnated over the same period and has 
even declined for those in the lower part of the income 
distribution.6  While there are many contributing causes to 
declining economic mobility in the United States, one that is 
significant—and is a low hanging fruit for substantial impact if 
eliminated—are the growing barriers of entry to employment 
imposed by occupational licensing. 
The rapid expansion in unjustified occupational licensing 
requirements over the last sixty years directly contributes to the 
indicators which represent the fading American Dream.  Using 
county-level data for the United States, the growth in licensing 
has been shown to be associated with increases in income 
inequality ranging from 3.9% to 15.4%, along with a 1.7% to 6.7% 
reduction in intergenerational economic mobility.7  This is a 
contributing factor to the decrease in real wages for the poorest 
Americans and has posed massive economic costs which fall 
disproportionately on the poorest Americans. 
Occupational licensing, much like what labor unions do for 
their members, often creates substantial increases in wages and 
benefits for license holders; however, unlike unions, which 
provide higher wages “by reallocating some of the profit” from 
 
4. Raj Chetty et al., The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute 
Income Mobility Since 1940, 356 SCIENCE 398, 398 (2017). 
5. Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Trends in Income and Wealth 
Inequality, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-and-wealth-
inequality/. 
6. See generally SARAH A. DONOVAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45090, 
REAL WAGE TRENDS, 1979 TO 2018 1–2 (updated July 23, 2019). 
7. Edward Timmons et al., Too Much License? A Closer Look at 
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business shareholders to workers through collective bargaining, 
“occupational licensing transfers income from consumers” to 
license holders in the form of higher prices.8  This fact is 
supported by an abundance of economic literature showing that 
barriers to entry reduce employment in an occupation, leading 
to higher wages for licensed workers but also to lower wages on 
average for those denied access.  The result is higher prices for 
consumers.9  For instance, a study estimating the effects of 
licensing for cosmetology—a commonly licensed profession with 
no obvious consumer health rationale—found that it increased 
prices for consumers by 19% and reduced total beauty shop visits 
by 14%.10 
For some professions, licensing not only increases prices for 
customers but can drastically reduce the availability of a whole 
class of services.  A shocking example of this is the comparison 
of African style-hair braiding in the neighboring states of 
Louisiana and Mississippi.  In Louisiana, hair braiders must 
complete 500 hours of training to earn a braiding license; in 
Mississippi, hair braiders only need to register with the state 
with no further fees or requirements.11  Despite having a 
significantly larger black population, Louisiana had only thirty-
two legal hair braiders in 2012, compared to around 1,200 in 
Mississippi.12  Louisiana is not alone in regulating hair braiding.  
Sixteen states “require hair braiders to get a cosmetology 
license” despite not being cosmetologists, and fourteen states 
and the District of Columbia require specialized hair braider 
licenses, including training of up to 600 hours.13  All this exists 
 
8. Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, 
BROOKINGS 6–7 (Mar. 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf. 
9. See DEPT. OF TREASURY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report
_final_nonembargo.pdf. 
10. A. Frank Adams, III et al., Occupational Licensing in a “Competitive” 
Labor Market: The Case of Cosmetology, 23 J. LAB. RSCH. 261, 272–73 (2002). 
11. Dick M. Carpenter II et al., License to Work: A National Study of 




13. Angela C. Erickson, Barriers to Braiding: How Job-Killing Licensing 
Laws Tangle Natural Hair Care in Needless Red Tape, INST. FOR JUST. 7 (July 
2016), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Barriers_To_Braiding-2.pdf. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/2
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even though there is no apparent health or safety justification 
for licensing hair braiders.  For example, over a seven-year 
period, there were zero complaints reported to most state 
licensing boards related to health or safety concerns over hair 
braiders; in fact, nearly all complaints were people reporting 
hair braiders operating without a license.14 
These examples are not unique.  Occupational licensing 
regulations burden hundreds of professions across the United 
States, driving some service providers out of business or 
underground and stymieing potential entrepreneurs before they 
get started.  The economic impact of occupational licensing is 
devastating.  Economists, using standard economic models, have 
shown that occupational licensing has resulted in “up to 2.85 
million fewer jobs” in the United States and poses “annual costs 
to consumers of $203 billion.”15  As the breadth and depth of 
occupational licensing varies greatly by state, so too do the costs 
incurred.  A 2018 study found that thirty-six states bore a heavy 
toll in jobs and economic losses due to licensing.16  The total jobs 
lost due to licensing as a percentage of total workers in each 
state vary from 0.92% in South Carolina to 6.72% in Hawaii; 
annual economic costs of occupational licensing as a percentage 
of state GDP likewise vary, ranging from 0.71% of GDP in Texas 
to 7.16% of GDP in Hawaii.17 
While occupational licensing exists for many high-income 
professions such as law, healthcare, education, and finance, it is 
low-income people and those who already have other barriers to 
employment that suffer from licensing the most.18  A recent 
study shows that the effect of licensing an occupation reduces 
 
14. See id. at 2. 
15. Kleiner, supra note 8, at 6. 
16. Morris M. Kleiner & Evgeny S. Vorotnikov, At What Cost? State and 
National Estimates of the Economic Costs of Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR 
JUST. 5 (Nov. 2018), https://ij.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Licensure_Report_WEB.pdf. 
17. Regional Economic Accounts, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, 
https://apps.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2021); see 
Kleiner & Vorotnikov, supra note 16, at 18. 
18. See Patrick A. McLaughlin et al., The Effects of Occupational 
Licensure on Competition, Consumers, and the Workforce, MERCATUS CTR. 
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the labor supply by an average of 17%–27%.19  It is no surprise 
then that when low-income occupations become licensed, the 
number of jobs available in that occupation evaporates.  Low-
income people who turn to entrepreneurship fare no better.20  
This is made worse by the fact that occupational licensing makes 
it harder for people to move from one occupation to another when 
new opportunities arise, and because licensing is typically done 
at the state level, it also contributes to reduced interstate 
mobility even for people not seeking to change occupations.21 
Many studies have shown the disparate impact of 
occupational licensing on ethnic and racial minorities.22  An 
example of racial and class disparities heightened by 
occupational licensing are the licensing requirements for 
interior designers in three states (Florida, Louisiana, and 
Nevada) and District of Columbia, which are in place due to 
lobbying by the American Society of Interior Designers.23  In 
addition to paying licensing fees between $1,120–$1,485, 
prospective interior designers are required to take an exam and 
have a bachelor’s degree.24  Black and Hispanic interior 
designers in the United States are around 20% less likely to hold 
a college degree compared to white interior designers, effectively 
excluding them from practicing their profession in those states.25  
Additionally, one of the most commonly licensed professions is 
that of a barber.  All fifty states and the District of Columbia 
require barbers to get a license, and Nevada specifically requires 
up to four separate exams, and training and education 
 
19. Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, How Much of Barrier to Entry is 
Occupational Licensing? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
25262, 2019). 
20. See Stephen Slivinski, Bootstraps Tangled in Red Tape, GOLDWATER 
INST. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/bootstraps-tangled-
in-red-tape/. 
21. See Mikkel Hermansen, Occupational Licensing and Job Mobility in 
the United States 41–43 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 1585, 2019). 
22. See generally Patrick A. McLaughlin et al., Regulatory Reform in 
Florida: An Opportunity for Greater Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency 
(Mercatus Ctr. George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-09, 2014). 
23. See generally David E. Harrington & Jaret Treber, Designed to 
Exclude: How Interior Design Insiders Use Government Power to Exclude 
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requirements leading to anywhere between 54 to 900 estimated 
calendar days lost.26  These regulations, mostly instituted in the 
early-mid twentieth century, have been shown to have reduced 
the probability of a black individual working as a legal barber by 
17.3%.27 
For populations with additional barriers to employment, 
such as the formerly incarcerated, young single mothers, and 
people with disabilities, the effects of occupational licensing are 
magnified.  One example is veterans, who often gain numerous 
skills in the military which may not  “translate” easily to the 
civilian economy.28  Occupational licensing makes the transition 
from active duty even harder for veterans.29  Military spouses 
suffer equally from occupational licensing, with constant moves 
across state lines complicating the lives of those who require a 
license for their occupation and discouraging others from 
entering such occupations in the first place.30  As a result, at 
least in part, military spouses in the United States earn an 
estimated 30% less than their civilian counterparts.31 
For the formerly incarcerated population, finding 
employment is always challenging due to stigma, lack of 
experience or education during prison time, and employment 
regulations, leading to 27% unemployment and high rates of 
recidivism.32  Occupational licensing only makes things worse.  
In addition to the burden which occupational licensing places on 
all low-income workers, the National Inventory of the Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction identifies over 16,000 additional 
restrictions on state occupational licenses and certifications for 
 
26. Carpenter et al., supra note 11, at 148. 
27. Marc T. Law & Mindy S. Marks, Effects of Occupational Licensing 
Laws on Minorities: Evidence from the Progressive Era, 52 J.L. & ECON. 351, 
359 (2009). 
28. Ryan D. Van Slyke & Nicholas J. Armstrong, Communities Serve: A 
Systematic Review of Need Assessments on U.S. Veteran and Military-
Connected Populations, 46 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 564, 573 (2019). 
29. See NAT’1 CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., THE STATE OF OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING 4 (2017). 
30. INST. FOR VETERANS & MIL. FAMS., MILITARY SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT 
REPORT 4 (2014). 
31. Id. at 6. 
32. Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: 
Unemployment Among Formerly Incarcerated People, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(July 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html. 
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formerly incarcerated people.33  Licensing boards in seven states 
can disqualify applicants for any felony; in seventeen states they 
can deny licenses regardless of whether the applicant has been 
rehabilitated, and in thirty-three states they can deny licenses 
to applicants even for an arrest that did not lead to a criminal 
conviction.34  The predictable result, as demonstrated by 
research, shows that in states with higher occupational licensing 
restrictions, the formerly incarcerated have an even harder time 
finding employment and reintegrating into the economy.35 
These massive costs have mobilized bipartisan support for 
occupational licensing reform in recent years, which has led to 
some legal and policy reforms at the state level.  However, the 
localized nature of licensing in the United States, and the 
organized power of special interest groups, have limited the 
political will for policy reform.  Complementary to policy reform, 
litigation has shown some success over the years as a means of 
tackling unjustified occupational licensing regimes.  In May 
2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Ladd v. Real Estate 
Commission,36 protected the right to pursue a chosen occupation 
under Article I Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  This 
holding, we believe, opens a powerful new avenue for taking on 
occupational licensing regulations through litigation. 
Article I Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
provides that “[a]ll men are born equally free and independent, 
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among 
which are those of enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property 
and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”37  
This clause, known to some as a Lockean natural rights 
guarantee,38 exists in either identical 
33. Population Spotlight: Occupational Licensing, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/population-spotlight-occupational-licensing.aspx. 
34. Nick Sibilla, Barred from Working: A Nationwide Study of
Occupational Licensing Barriers for Ex-Offenders, INST. FOR JUSTICE 1 (Aug. 
2020), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Barred-from-Working-
August-2020-Update.pdf. 
35. See Hermansen, supra note 21, at 3, 30.
36. Ladd v. Real Est. Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1108 (Pa. 2020).
37. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
38. See Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural 
Rights Guarantees, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2015).  While some use the 
phrase “Lockean natural rights guarantee,” we will, for simplicity reasons only, 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/2
64 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  41.2 
or substantially similar form in thirty-three different state 
constitutions.39  So, while Ladd’s holding certainly has 
important implications for Pennsylvanians specifically, we 
believe this case provides an opportunity for those seeking to 
challenge occupational licensing regulations via litigation in 
other states as well. 
As such, Ladd’s holding could signal an important shift in 
the way economic regulations are litigated in the state court 
systems.  Using state courts to litigate economic liberty is 
particularly important considering the advancement of economic 
liberty through the federal courts has been at a near standstill 
for many years, even while bipartisan political momentum for 
occupational licensing reform is growing.40  As such, the state 
court systems are proving to be a more fertile fora for economic 
liberty litigation.41  State constitutions can be interpreted by the 
state courts to protect economic liberty more rigorously than the 
U.S Constitution because the state constitutions are not merely 
“little copies of the U.S. Constitution.”42  They contain additional 
provisions that protect their citizens’ economic liberties more 
robustly.43 
 
use the term “natural rights clause” as this term refers to the same types of 
provisions.  See id. 
39. Other states include: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1), Alaska 
(ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 1), Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2), California (CAL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 1), Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 
1, § 2), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ I), Hawaii (HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 2), 
Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1), Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 1), Indiana (IND. 
CONST. art. 1, § 1), Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1), Kansas, (KAN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 1), Maine (ME. CONST. art. 1, § 1), Massachusetts (MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 1), 
Missouri (MO. CONST. art. 1, § 2), Montana (MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 3), Nebraska 
(NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1), Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 1), New Hampshire 
(N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 2), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 1), New Mexico 
(N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 4), North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1), North Dakota 
(N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 1), Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1), Oklahoma (OKLA. 
CONST. art. 2, § 2), Oregon (OR. CONST. art. I, § 1), South Dakota (S.D. CONST. 
art. 6, § 1), Utah (UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 1), Vermont (VT. CONST. Ch I, art. 1), 
Virginia (VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1), West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1), and 
Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 1). 
40. See Dawn Bauman, The Climate for Licensing Community Association 
Managers: Sweeping Occupational Licensing Reform, CMTY. ASSN’S INST. (Jun. 
13, 2019), https://advocacy.caionline.org/comm-mgr-licensing/. 
41. Dana Berliner, Are States Protecting Economic Liberty?, 43 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 77, 78 (2020). 
42. Id. at 77. 
43. Id. at 78. 
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We believe that Ladd provides a useful example of a state 
court using a natural rights clause to protect economic liberty.  
As far as we can tell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the 
first court to protect the right to pursue a chosen occupation as 
a natural right.  Despite this, the court did not properly examine 
the historical basis for its own conclusion—that the right to 
pursue a chosen occupation is protected by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution as a natural right.  So, while we agree with Ladd’s 
holding, the primary purpose of this article is to dive deeper into 
the historical basis for the court’s decision.  In doing so, we hope 
to demonstrate that Ladd’s holding is historically sound and, 
thus, can be an effective argument in state court forums when 
challenging occupational licensing regimes. 
This article proceeds in three parts.  In part II, we describe 
occupational licensing, its burdens, and the Ladd case itself.  In 
part III, we defend Ladd’s holding, discuss its implications, and 
explore its historical underpinnings.  Finally, in part IV, we 
discuss what Ladd can teach those who seek to challenge 
occupational licensing regulations through state court litigation. 
II. THE BURDENS OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND 
LADD 
Sara Ladd, the litigant in the Ladd case, was the owner of 
two vacation properties in the Pocono Mountains.44  She offered 
those properties as short-term rentals through Airbnb and other 
similar platforms but was reported to the Pennsylvania Real 
Estate Commission for “unlicensed practice of real-estate.”45  
According to Pennsylvania law, Ms. Ladd was required to get a 
real estate broker’s license in order for her to operate her Airbnb 
properties.  This entailed spending three years working for an 
established broker, passing two exams, and setting up a brick-
and-mortar office in Pennsylvania.46 
Pennsylvania is not the only state to have imposed such 
draconian measures on short-term rental owners.  In total, forty 
states maintain laws that similarly subject Airbnb hosts and 
 
44. Ladd v. Real Est. Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1100 (Pa. 2020). 
45. Id. at 1101. 
46. AirBnB Property Manager Files Constitutional Challenge to Pa. Real 
Estate Licensing Regime, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/pennsylvania-
property-management/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2021). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/2
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other short-term vacation rentals to traditional real estate 
brokers licenses.47  At the city level, restrictions can be even 
more stringent.  For example, the City of Denver requires a 
special short-term rental license for Airbnb hosts and takes a 
10.75% tax on guests,48 while Santa Monica, California, and 
New York City—with pressure from hotel lobbyists—instituted 
outright bans on landlords providing short-term rentals on 
Airbnb and other similar platforms (in New York, eventually a 
settlement with Airbnb was reached to allow it to continue 
operating after some concessions).49  Yet, despite the obvious 
economic costs of these regulations, these regulatory schemes 
are entrenched in American municipal and state governments.  
We now briefly explain how that came to be. 
A. Origins and Growth of Occupational Licensing 
Since WWII, few regulatory regimes have grown in scope as 
quickly as occupational licensing.50  In 1950, only 5% of  the 
employed population was licensed, but now around 20% of 
employed Americans are licensed workers.51  Research has 
shown that this growth does not come from workers moving from 
farm and factory jobs to traditionally licensed occupations, such 
as medicine and law, but rather is driven by new laws expanding 
licensing to previously unlicensed occupations, often without 
justifications due to health or safety concerns.52  These barriers 
to entry most adversely affect those who experience additional 
barriers to employment, such as the formerly incarcerated, 
young single moms, and people with disabilities.53 
 
47. Id. 
48. Matt Powers, Denver Now Licensing Airbnb Services, INST. FOR 
JUSTICE (July 7, 2016), https://ij.org/denver-now-licensing-airbnb-services/. 
49. Tim Logan, Santa Monica Comes Down Hard on Airbnb; Will 
Crackdown Spread?, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2015, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-santa-monica-council-oks-
tough-rental-regs-20150512-story.html; Kate Conger, Airbnb Sues New York 
City, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 21, 2016, 5:31 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/21/aibnb-sues-new-york-city/; Erik Engquist, 
Why Did Airbnb Give in to de Blasio?, THEREALDEAL (June 15, 2020, 8:50 AM), 
https://therealdeal.com/2020/06/15/why-did-airbnb-give-in-to-de-blasio/. 
50. Kleiner, supra note 8, at 2. 
51. Kleiner & Vorotnikov, supra note 16, at 5. 
52. DEPT. OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9, at 4. 
53. McLaughlin et al., supra note 18, at 5–7. 
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Occupational licensing can have valid justifications, 
especially when focused on health and safety, but far too often 
licensing is used primarily as a tool for limiting competition by 
creating barriers to entry that create a privileged class who are 
usually the only ones to benefit.  A review of the literature on 
occupational licensing in the United States indicates that 
licensing does not generally improve the quality of goods and 
services or public health and safety.54 
Like many similar anti-competitive practices, occupational 
licensing is often driven by “rent-seeking” by entrenched interest 
groups—behavior aimed at shifting money to the group 
members at the expense of the entire economy.  For many 
industries in the United States, occupational licensing is the 
result of lobbying by professional associations.  Additionally, 
states frequently delegate their regulatory authority to licensing 
boards populated largely by practitioners —those with direct 
interest in tighter regulation of their profession.55 
This is an age-old phenomenon that dates back as far as 
human commerce.  Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations noted that 
“[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.”56  Laws against anti-competitive practices have their 
origins in Roman law which, as far back as 50 B.C. in the lex 
Julia de Annona, imposed heavy fines on traders who banded 
together to increase grain prices.57  While laws against anti-
competitive practices and monopolies have continued until 
modern times, anti-competitive practices and rent-seeking 
behavior continue to wreak economic havoc where interest 
groups have remained strongest, whether the guilds of Europe 
in the Middle Ages or the commercial lobbies and professional 
associations of today.58 
 
54. See McLaughlin et al., supra note 18, at 3–5. 
55. Ryan Nunn, The Future of Occupational Licensing Reform, BROOKINGS 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-future-of-
occupational-licensing-reform/. 
56. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 105–06 (Harriman House ed., 4th ed. 2007). 
57. Pierre A. Picarda, A Brief Summary of the Law for the Prevention of 
Restrictive Practices in France, 2 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. SUPP. PUB. 79, 79 (1961). 
58. An interesting example of this are the studies on the economic effect 
of European guilds in the Middle Ages by Sheilagh Ogilvie, which find that 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/2
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There are essentially two main mechanisms for tackling the 
immense burdens imposed by unjustified occupational licensing: 
legislative reform and legal challenges in court.  While 
legislative reform is perhaps the best way to cut away 
unjustified occupational licensing requirements—and many 
states have taken steps to do just that59—we choose to focus on 
the latter: using litigation to successfully challenge and 
eliminate occupational licensing regulations. 
B. Attempted Legislative Reform of Occupational Licensing 
The broad consensus on the harmful burdens of 
occupational licensing has led policy experts of every political 
stripe to call for the overhaul of occupational licensing regimes 
in the United States.  This includes a broad array of think tanks 
from the center-left Brookings Institution,60 the Progressive 
Center for American Progress,61 and Progressive Policy 
 
“[g]uild rent‐seeking imposed deadweight losses on the economy and generated 
no demonstrable positive externalities. Industry flourished where guilds 
decayed.”  Sheilagh Ogilvie, Rehabilitating the Guilds: A Reply, 61 ECON. HIST. 
REV. 175, 175 (2008). 
59. According to a database of occupational licensing legislation regarding 
30 most highly licensed occupations kept by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 10 states have adopted 
34 pieces of legislation aimed at reducing the burden of occupational licensing 
for one or more professions in some way since 2017.  These states include: 
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas.  Additionally, since 2016, nine state 
governors have signed executive orders temporarily or permanently removing 
licensing requirements or mandating a statewide review of occupational 
licensing regimes.  These states include: Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania.  
Occupational Licensing Legislation Database, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (June 19, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/occupational-licensing636476435.aspx; Iris Hentze, Occupational 
Licensing Executive Order Tracker, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 25, 
2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/occupational-
licensing-executive-order-tracker.aspx. 
60. See, e.g., Brad Hershbein et al., Nearly 30 Percent of Workers in the 
U.S. Need a License to Perform Their Job: It Is Time to Examine Occupational 




61. See, e.g., Removing Barriers to Economic Opportunity for Americans 
with Criminal Records Is Focus of New Multistate Initiative by CAP, NELP, 
and CLS, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 12, 2017), 
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Institute62 on the left, and the libertarian Cato Institute63 and 
conservative Heritage Foundation64 on the right.  In recent 
years, both the Obama Administration65 and Trump 
Administration66 have called on states to implement 
occupational licensing reforms. 
Over the past five years, states from both sides of the 
political spectrum have begun to tackle occupational licensing, 
albeit in a piecemeal manner.  In 2016, Iowa, Kentucky, and 
Nebraska removed licensing requirements for African-style hair 
braiders,67 and Indiana joined them in 2017,68 bringing the total 
number of states which have exempted hair braiders from 
licensing to 23.69  Some other recent examples include Wisconsin 
ending licensing requirements for selling home baked goods in 
2017,70 and Tennessee delicensing shampoo providers and 
servicers in 2017; Tennessee also passed legislation to reduce 
barriers in obtaining occupational licenses by formerly 





62. See, e.g., Unleashing Innovation & Growth: A Progressive Alternative 




63. See, e.g., Angela C. Erickson, The Tangled Mess of Occupational 
Licensing, 40 CATO POL’Y REP. 5 (2018). 
64. See, e.g., Salim Furth, Understanding the Data on Occupational 
Licensing, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-
and-labor/report/understanding-the-data-occupational-licensing. 
65. See, e.g., DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9. 
66. See, e.g., The White House, The President’s Principles on Workforce 




67. Furth, supra note 64, at 10. 
68. A look at Occupational Licensing Reform Across the United States, 
ARK. CTR. FOR RSCH. IN ECONS. 53 (2018), 
https://uca.edu/acre/files/2018/10/ACRE_occupational-licensing-state-reforms-
WEB-FINAL.pdf. 
69. Carpenter et al., supra note 11, at 35. 
70. Jennifer McDonald, Ready to Roll: Nine Lessons from Ending 
Wisconsin’s Home-Baking Ban, INST. FOR JUST. 3 (Nov. 2018), https://ij.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Wisconsin-Home-Bakers-FINAL.pdf. 
71. A look at Occupational Licensing Reform Across the United States, 
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Michigan provides a rare example of a comprehensive 
reform effort for occupational licensing across many professions, 
but after years of efforts, the state legislature was only able to 
agree on completely delicensing six of the twenty + occupations 
recommended for elimination after review: auctioneers, 
community planners, dieticians and nutritionists, immigration 
clerical assistants, ocularists, and proprietary school solicitors.72  
Recent 2019 legislation in Ohio provides another example of an 
attempt to tackle occupational licensing at a large scale.  The 
law mandates that every state licensing board will expire every 
six years unless explicitly renewed by the legislature, along with 
periodic reviews of each board’s staff, budget, and enforcement 
actions to determine whether it has “inhibited economic growth, 
reduced efficiency, or increased the cost of government.”73  
Additionally, the law eliminates barriers for formerly 
incarcerated people to get licenses, who previously were barred 
from 25% of jobs in the state.74  Also in 2019, Arizona passed 
significant legislation mandating universal license recognition, 
allowing all new state residents who already had an 
occupational license in another state to have their out-of-state 
license recognized in Arizona.75 
However, legislation can be a slow and often ineffective 
approach to tackling occupational licensing burdens due to the 
local nature of the regulations and powerful special interests at 
the state and local levels.  A review published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in 2015 found that only seven occupations had 
been completely and permanently delicensed in the United 
States over the previous forty years: naturopaths in Virginia 
(1973), private investigators in Colorado (1977), watchmakers in 
Wisconsin (1979), morticians in Colorado (1981), watchmakers 
in Minnesota (1983), egg candlers in Colorado (1994), and 
 
supra note 68, at 25. 
72. Id. at 5–10. 
73. Liam Sigaud, Momentum Builds for Occupational Licensing Reform 




75. Patrick Gleason, Governors & Lawmakers Successfully Remove 
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interior designers in Alabama (2004).76  An eighth case was 
Alabama, which for a while became the only state to delicense 
barbers (1983) before passing new licensing legislation again 
(2013 at the behest of the Alabama Board of Cosmetology).77  
While efforts have increased over the past five years, it seems 
likely that legislation on its own will be a slow, plodding path 
towards comprehensive occupational licensing reform.  For this 
reason, litigation may often be a more attractive path towards 
tackling unjustified occupational licensing.  Importantly, in 
Ladd, we find an exemplary case of using litigation to 
successfully challenge occupational licensing regimes. 
C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision in Ladd 
Sara Ladd sued the Pennsylvania Real Estate Commission 
seeking a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, 
alleging that Pennsylvania’s broker requirements imposed 
“unlawful burdens on her right to pursue her chosen 
occupation.”78  Her suit made its way to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, where the court agreed with her.79  Importantly, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by citing the 
state constitution’s natural rights clause, which provides that: 
“[a]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those 
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of 
pursuing their own happiness.”80  This provision, the court said, 
protects “the right to pursue a chosen occupation.”81  Or, in other 
words, the “right to pursue a chosen occupation” is now 
protectable under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s natural 
 
76. Robert J. Thornton & Edward J. Timmons, The De-licensing of 
Occupations in the United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 4–6 (May 2015), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/pdf/the-de-licensing-of-occupations-
in-the-united-states.pdf. 
77. Id. at 3; see Mike Cason, Alabama Gears Up to License and Regulate 
Barbers Under New Law, AL.COM (May 31, 2013, updated Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.al.com/wire/2013/05/alabama_gears_up_to_license_an.html. 
78. Ladd v. Real Estate Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1101 (Pa. 2020). 
79. Id. at 1098. 
80. Id. at 1108 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 1). 
81. Id. (citing Nixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 288 (Pa. 2003); 
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 636–37 (Pa. 1954)). 
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rights clause.82  That is a monumental holding. 
The court, unfortunately, neither explained its conclusion 
thoroughly, nor delved into the historical basis for its conclusion.  
Instead, the court’s analysis was based on the use of its own 
precedents: Nixon v. Department of Public Welfare83 and 
Gambone v. Commonwealth.84  However, neither of these cases 
adequately grapple with the gravity of declaring the right to 
pursue a chosen occupation as a protectable natural right. 
In Nixon, the court only noted that Pennsylvania’s natural 
rights clause “guarantees persons in this Commonwealth certain 
inalienable rights.”85  In Gambone, the court’s natural rights 
analysis is similarly lacking—the impetus of the court’s decision 
was that the state’s police powers are restrained by the state and 
federal constitutions through the power of judicial review.86  
Nonetheless, despite the Ladd court’s hurried analysis, we 
believe its conclusion is correct.  As such, it provides a powerful 
argument to litigants seeking to reign in the ballooning 
occupational licensing schemes existing in the United States. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF LADD 
A. Ladd-type Litigation Offers the Most Immediate Way to 
Achieve Occupational Licensing Reform 
The economic and social costs posed by expansive 
occupational licensing have been repeatedly highlighted by 
policymakers as well through litigation, as seen in Ladd.  Yet 
occupational licensing remains at record levels and has become 
even more burdensome over the past decade.87  Even with 
unusual bipartisan support and widespread efforts, why has 
occupational licensing reform been relatively slow and often 
minimal?  An optimistic answer is time: the movement to reform 
occupational licensing has only gained widespread momentum 
over the past five years, and governments move slowly.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic has been a catalyst for states to move more 
 
82. Id. 
83. Nixon, 839 A.2d at 277. 
84. Gambone, 101 A.2d at 634. 
85. Nixon, 839 A.2d at 286. 
86. Gambone, 101 A.2d at 636–37. 
87. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
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quickly to reduce licensing requirements for various medical 
occupations.  Thirty states have made reforms, including 
suspended or reduced licensing requirements for medical 
occupations, expediting the licensing process or allowing 
temporary licenses for people who had not yet met all testing 
requirements, and allowing reciprocity for out-of-state 
licenses.88 
The pessimistic answer is that the localized nature of 
licensing in the United States and the influence of special 
interest groups with state legislatures limit avenues and 
political will for reform, even where governors and other political 
leaders make it a centerpiece of their agendas.  City-level 
licensing rules can further complicate the process, as in the case 
of Detroit, which requires licenses for sixty occupations, half of 
which are also licensed at the state level.89  Thus, in Detroit, one 
needs to comply with both state and local licensing requirements 
if one wishes to practice one of those specific occupations. 
Because attempted legislative reform regarding 
occupational licensing has largely failed in reducing these 
burdens, as discussed supra II.B, litigation following the model 
of Ladd is an attractive alternative for addressing similar 
questions.  This type of litigation can occur at either the state or 
federal level.  While litigation seeking to protect economic 
freedoms can be successful in a federal forum,90 such success is 
 
88. Five states suspended or reduced licensing requirements for medical 
occupations (Alaska, Arizona, Maine, Vermont, Wisconsin), six states 
expedited the licensing process or sanctioned temporary licenses for people 
who had not yet met all testing requirements (Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Iowa, Massachusetts, and New Jersey), and twenty-one states permitted 
reciprocity for out-of-state licenses (California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia).  
Daniel Greenberg, States Respond to Coronavirus with Occupational Licensing 
Reforms, DEP’T LAB. (May 19, 2020), https://blog.dol.gov/2020/05/19/states-
respond-to-coronavirus-with-occupational-licensing-reforms. 
89. Jarrett Skorup, This Isn’t Working. How Michigan’s Licensing Laws 
Hurt Workers and Consumers, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y 14 (2017), 
https://www.mackinac.org/archives/2017/s2017-02.pdf. 
90. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217, 226–27 (5th Cir. 
2013) (invalidating a law restricting the sale of funeral merchandise to state-
licensed funeral directors in challenge by Benedictine monks wanting to sell 
handcrafted pine coffins); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991–92 n.15 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(invalidating state law banning sale of caskets by anyone other than funeral 
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not the norm.  As explained below, there is little protection for 
economic liberties under current federal court jurisprudence, 
resulting in fewer ways to challenge occupational licensing 
requirements in that manner.  Thus, we think it is best to use 
the state court systems to challenge unjustified occupational 
licensing regulations.  However, limited economic liberty 
protections at the federal level was not always the case. 
After the famous 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York, 
economic liberty received robust protection under the United 
States Constitution. In Lochner, New York State made it a 
misdemeanor to require or permit an employee working for a 
baker to work more than sixty hours in a one week.91  One such 
employer, after being found in violation of the statute, 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute in federal court.92  
When the United States Supreme Court heard the case, it held 
that: 
 
The statute necessarily interferes with the right 
of contract between the employer and 
employe[e]s, concerning the number of hours in 
which the latter may labor in the bakery of the 
employer.  The general right to make a contract in 
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.93 
 
In other words, the Court held that the U.S. Constitution 
protects the right to contract.  The right to contract is an 
important and is perhaps the most essential aspect of economic 
liberty.94  While free market advocates could say that Lochner 
was a victory, it was a short-lived victory.  In 1937, Lochner was 
 
directors on the basis that the law infringed on economic liberty); Casket 
Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434, 436–37 (S.D. Miss. 2000); 
Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 607–08 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (“[A] 
statute based on pure favoritism which creates a closed class will likely be 
declared unconstitutional.”). 
91. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). 
94. Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 (2012). 
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overturned by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.95  Since West 
Coast Hotel, so-called economic liberties are scantly protected 
under the United States Constitution.  As the Court itself put it, 
“[w]hen economic legislation does not employ classifications 
subject to heightened scrutiny or impinge on fundamental 
rights,courts generally view constitutional challenges with the 
skepticism due respect for legislative choices demands.”96  
Moreover, the current federal test for economic regulations—the 
rational basis test97—has been characterized as “weak.”98  As 
one law professor put it: 
 
By allowing any plausible reason for the 
legislation to suffice, whether or not it was a true 
reason for the legislation, and by asking only 
whether lawmakers could have thought that it 
was reasonably related to the subject it purported 
to advance, the Court has essentially made the 
rational basis test the equivalent to no test at 
all.99 
 
Another commentator put it: rational basis scrutiny is “minimal 
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.”100 
Additionally, Lochner’s restoration, for many reasons, will 
not likely come about.  As it stands today, the treatment of 
Lochner is “almost uniformly hostile, but it differs sharply along 
ideological lines: conservatives decry the case for protecting 
unenumerated rights [under the Fourteenth Amendment], while 
liberals shun it for protecting the wrong unenumerated 
rights.”101  Thus, it is unlikely that it will be revived, and we do 
 
95. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
96. Levin v. Com. Energy, 560 U.S. 413, 426 (2010). 
97. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding 
that laws regulating businesses need to only survive rational basis review and 
that the Court need not contemplate all the reasons for the legislation). 
98. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis 
Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth 
Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2011). 
99. Id. 
100. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). 
101. Brandon R. Magner, Note, Burying Lochner: Why Courts Should 
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not advocate for its revival.  Lochner is widely considered part of 
the constitutional anti-canon.102  That is, it is part of “the set of 
cases whose central propositions all legitimate decisions must 
refute[.]”103  In many legal circles, it keeps company with cases 
such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and 
Korematsu v. United States.104  While it is possible the United 
States Supreme Court will change course and protect economic 
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment (thereby, effectively 
reinstating Lochner), it is very unlikely.  However, regardless of 
the merits of such an argument, our point is merely this: because 
federal courts only minimally scrutinize economic regulations, 
they are not the best forum to challenge those regulations.  
Consequently, as one commentator stated, since the 1930s, the 
United States Supreme Court “essentially stopped paying 
serious attention to [economic liberty] matters.”105 
Even though the Court has arguably neglected this area of 
the law, there has been a resurgence in scholarship arguing that 
the U.S. Constitution does, in fact, protect economic liberty.106  
At the forefront of this movement is Professor Randy Barnett, 
who suggests that the U.S. Constitution does protect economic 
liberty, not under the due process clause in the 14th 
Amendment, but under the privileges and immunities clause.107  
However, even Professor Barnett recognizes that the Supreme 
Court has “effectively gutted the [p]rivileges or [i]mmunities 
[c]lause[.]”108  And he acknowledges economic regulations will 
“be upheld if the court c[an] conceive of any hypothetical reason 
why the legislature might have enacted the restriction.”109 
Nonetheless, while the debate about whether the U.S. 
Constitution may protect economic liberty is undergoing a 
 
Reject Coming Attempts to Revive Economic Due Process, 106 KY. L.J. 463, 477 
(2018). 
102. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011). 
103. Id. 
104. See id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944)). 
105. TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM AND THE LAW 279 (2010). 
106. See Barnett, supra note 94, at 5. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 11. 
109. Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee 
Optical, 19 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 845, 856 (2012). 
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renaissance, in practice, most restrictions to economic liberty are 
currently subject to little scrutiny in federal courts.110  
Therefore, those seeking to challenge occupational licensing 
regulations in court are better off (or at least not worse off) 
litigating in the state court systems.  Even those who argue that 
the U.S Constitution does protect economic liberty suggest that 
state courts are a good place to achieve occupational licensing 
reform.  For example, as the litigation director for the Institute 
for Justice (an organization that focuses on occupational 
licensing reform) put it, “I do not agree at all with the conclusion 
that there is no federal constitutional protection for economic 
liberty, but there is a lot of opportunity for state constitutional 
litigation now.”111  As such, Ladd represents a growing trend of 
state supreme courts that, unlike their federal court 
counterparts, are willing to recognize economic liberty and 
attempt to protect it.  To be sure, Ladd is not the first example 
of a state supreme court providing more protections for economic 
liberty than the federal courts.112  However, Ladd is the first 
modern case we are aware of to protect economic liberty as a 
natural right. 
B. The Importance of Natural Rights 
The crux of Ladd’s holding is that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution’s natural rights clause protects the “right to pursue 
a chosen occupation.”113  This is a momentous holding because it 
means that in Pennsylvania, the right to pursue a chosen 
occupation is recognized to be a natural right as opposed to a 
 
110. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 483 (1955) 
(holding that laws regulating businesses need to only survive rational basis 
review and that the Court need not contemplate all the reasons for the 
legislation). 
111. Berliner, supra note 41, at 77. 
112. See Ladd v. Real Est. Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1096 (Pa. 2020); see 
also Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor of Baltimore, 235 A.3d 873 (Md. 2020) 
(holding that an economic regulation did not violate due process, but that it 
was unconstitutionally vague); Jackson v. Raffensperger, 843 S.E.2d 576, 578 
(Ga. 2020) (holding that certain occupational licensing requirements violated 
both Georgia’s due process and equal protection guarantees); Patel v. Tex. 
Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 91 (Tex. 2015) (holding that 
occupational licensing requirements violate TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19, the state’s 
due process clause); Alabama v. Lupo, 984 So. 2d 395, 411 (Ala. 2007) 
(recognizing that economic liberties deserve protection). 
113. Ladd, 230 A.3d at 1108. 
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civil or acquired right.  The difference between the two classes 
of rights is significant because a natural right is one that is 
independent of the government.114  Meanwhile, a civil right 
requires the existence of government in order to exercise it.115  
Philip Hamburger aptly explains the difference between the two: 
 
[F]reedom of speech or of the press was a right 
that could be exercised in the absence of 
government and therefore was considered a 
natural right, whereas the right of a sheriff to 
retain his position, notwithstanding his political 
views, could only be had under government and 
therefore was distinguished as an acquired 
right.116 
 
The founding generation had great reverence for natural 
rights.  Indeed, they believed that the basic reason for forming a 
government was to protect these rights: “[T]o secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men[.]”117  Thus, the 
protection of these rights was at the forefront of their minds 
when the colonists broke away from England.  Consequently, 
when a government infringes on these rights, “it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government[.]”118  John Adams said, “[r]ights that cannot be 
repealed or restrained by human laws—[are] Rights[ ]derived 
from the great legislator of the universe.”119  Moreover, as 
Alexander Hamilton put it, all civil liberty is “founded in” 
natural liberty.120  As such, liberty cannot be wrested away from 
 
114. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 54 (rev. ed. 2014). 
115. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and 
American Constitutions, 102 YALE L. REV. 907, 908 (1993). 
116. Id. 
117. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis 
added). 
118. Id. 
119. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND THE FEUDAL LAW 
(1782), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 335 (Charles Francis Adams 
ed., 1851). 
120. Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (1775), reprinted in 1 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 53 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., Fed. ed. 1850). 
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the people without “the most manifest violation of justice[.]”121  
The founding generation held this view because natural rights 
were understood to be more fundamental than civil rights and so 
they ought to be more fundamentally protected. 
This respect for natural rights is not solely an American 
notion either.  Sir William Blackstone, the great English jurist, 
remarked that the protection of natural rights was “the principal 
aim of society.”122  Additionally, the idea that the government 
could not infringe on a natural right was not merely rhetoric 
saved for the Declaration of Independence, but rather a legal 
reality which early American judges sought to protect.  For 
example, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, in the 1798 case 
Calder v. Bull, summed up the Court’s early attitude towards 
legislation that violated these so-called natural rights: 
 
There are certain vital principles in our free 
Republican governments, which will determine 
and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of 
legislative power[.] An A[ct] of the Legislature (for 
I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact, cannot be 
considered a rightful exercise of legislative 
authority.123 
 
And Justice Iredell, concurring in Calder, said: 
 
If the Legislature pursue the authority delegated 
to them, their acts are valid. [ ] If they transgress 
the boundaries of that authority, their acts are 
invalid. In the former case, they exercise the 
discretion vested in them by the people, to whom 
alone they are responsible for the faithful 
discharge of their trust: but in the latter case, they 
violate a fundamental law, which must be our 
guide, whenever we are called upon as judges to 
determine the validity of a legislative act.124 
 
121. Id. 
122. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124. 
123. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). 
124. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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To some extent, this line of thinking continues even today: 
“laws that violate these [natural] rights do not advance the 
general welfare or common good.  Indeed, they harm it, and by 
so doing undermine the justification for claiming a duty of 
obedience[]” to those laws.125 
Therefore, when Ladd recognized that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution protects the right to pursue a chosen occupation 
under its natural rights clause, it elevated that right to be as 
important as the right to free speech (as compared to merely 
treating it as a civil right, such as the right to use public 
facilities).  To reach its conclusion, Ladd relied on the 
Pennsylvania Constitution’s natural rights clause.126  And that 
language imitates the language found in the Declaration of 
Independence.127  Pennsylvania’s clause states that “[a]ll men 
are born equally free and independent, and have certain 
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing 
and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their 
own happiness.”128  As Ladd noted, the question essentially is: 
does the ability to “possess property” and “pursue happiness” 
encompass the right to pursue a chosen occupation?  While the 
court reasoned that they do,129 it did not delve into the historical 
basis for its conclusion.130  So, while we agree with Ladd’s 
conclusion, one of the chief purposes of this article is to dive 
deeper into the historical basis for its conclusion.  In doing so, 
our goal is twofold: (1) provide additional support for Ladd’s 
conclusion; and (2) develop an argument for advocates seeking 
to reduce the burdens of occupational licensing regulations that 
may be used in the thirty-three other states which also claim to 
protect natural rights in through their state constitutions. 
 
125. BARNETT, supra note 114, at 85 (emphasis added). 
126. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
127. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
128. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
129. Ladd v. Real Est. Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1108 (Pa. 2020). 
130. Id. 
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C. Identifying a Natural Right 
Our ultimate inquiry is whether Article I Section I, the 
natural rights clause, of the Pennsylvania Constitution protects 
an individual’s natural right to pursue a chosen occupation.  
Determining whether something is a natural right can be a 
difficult task because “any such natural law principles may be 
more difficult to discern and consequently more controversial 
than the principles of engineering or architecture.”131  That is so 
because as Justice Iredell put it: “[t]he ideas of natural justice 
are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest 
men have differed upon the subject[.]”132 
Importantly, because natural rights deserve so much 
deference,133 courts ought to take great care before they declare 
something a natural right lest they do so haphazardly and 
undercut otherwise legitimate legislative choices.  For example, 
the Kansas Supreme Court recently declared that the Kansas 
Constitution’s natural rights clause protects a natural right to 
end a pregnancy.134  However, as argued in a forthcoming law 
review article, the court’s analysis on the question was shoddy 
and incomplete.135  And, when courts conduct an incomplete 
analysis, they risk creating more problems than they solve.  
Thus, before any court declares a right to be a natural right, it 
must exercise prudence.  Therefore, we will (and urge courts to) 
heed to the advice Professor Barnett, relying on former Ohio 
Senator John Sherman, gave, stating that when courts need to 
identify the existence of a natural right, they should: 
 
[L]ook first at the Constitution of the United 
States as the primary foundation of authority. If 
that does not define the right they will look for the 
unenumerated powers to the Declaration of 
American Independence, to every scrap of 
 
131. Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor’s Guide to Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 657 (1997). 
132. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
133. See generally Hermansen, supra note 21. 
134. Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2019). 
135. See generally Skylar Reese Croy & Alexander Lemke, An Unnatural 
Reading of History: The Revisionist History of Abortion in Hodes v. Schmidt, 
32 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3708558). 
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American history, to the history of England, to the 
common law of England, the decisions of Lords 
Mansfield and Holt, and so on back to the earliest 
recorded decisions of the common law. There they 
will find the fountain and reservoir of the rights of 
Americans as English citizens.136 
 
Importantly, “judges should exercise caution and restraint 
before declaring a natural right—and they should do so only 
after an exhaustive search of the historical record.”137  We will 
borrow a lesson from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where two 
dissenting judges interpreted that state’s natural rights clause 
in another economic liberty case using historical sources: 
 
[The] framers of our state constitution expressly 
incorporated language from the Declaration of 
Independence, including liberty among those 
inherent rights governments are instituted to 
protect. Therefore, we may ascertain the original 
public meaning of liberty by considering the 
documented perspective of our nation’s founders, 
in particular the principal author of the 
Declaration of Independence, Thomas 
Jefferson.138 
 
Because the Pennsylvania Constitution also uses Thomas 
Jefferson’s words, we need to conduct a historical inquiry to 
understand what he meant by them when he wrote these words 
in the Declaration of Independence.  We will further consider 
what Jefferson’s mentors and contemporaries thought on the 
matter and what early American courts and thinkers considered 
when they examined laws regulating economic activity.139 
 
136. BARNETT, supra note 114, at 67. 
137. Croy & Lemke, supra note 135, at 42. 
138. See Porter v. State, 913 N.W.2d 842, 855 (2018) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
139. We do not purport to engage in an exhaustive historical survey.  That 
is beyond the scope of this paper, which is to examine the viability of Ladd’s 
claim that the right to pursue a chosen occupation is within the original 
understanding of what a natural right is.  See generally Timothy Sandefur, The 
Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 207 (2003) (giving a more robust 
historical analysis). 
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1. The Pre-Jefferson Understanding of Economic Liberty 
Before delving into what Jefferson thought about the “right 
to pursue a chosen occupation,” it would be helpful to 
understand the thoughts of Jefferson’s mentors on the subject.  
It is well-known that American jurisprudence owes much to its 
English ancestor, and perhaps its two most important ancestors 
are Sir William Blackstone and Lord Edward Coke.  It is said 
that Blackstone “almost singlehandedly shaped the course of 
American law.”140  He had a “prime influence on the Declaration 
of Independence.”141  As to Coke, “no writer in the intervening 
period approached Lord Coke in providing as complete and 
authoritative [an] overview of the common law.”142  Specifically, 
Thomas Jefferson called Coke the “father” of legal science.143 
Blackstone’s message could not be more clear: “At common 
law every man might use what trade he pleased . . . .”144  Coke 
provides a bit more insight, and, as one scholar put it, he may 
“rightly be regarded as the founding father of what is now called 
‘economic substantive due process.’”145  In Coke’s day, “the right 
of the king to control the economy was limited at common 
law[.]”146  That was so because “[t]he right to support oneself by 
a lawful calling was not only central to the health of the state, 
but to the lives of citizens.”147  Therefore, Coke vigorously 
defended the free choice of occupation throughout his various 
opinions.  This defense, however, was “not intended to protect 
the rich, but exactly the opposite: to defend the poor from legal 
restrictions on the freedom which gave them a chance to work 
their way out of poverty.”148  For he said, “[n]o man ought to be 
put from his livelihood without answer.”149 
 
140. Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American 
Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 731 (1976). 
141. Id. at 731–32 (citation omitted). 
142. Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What 
They Are, and What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 776–77 
(2004). 
143. L.K. Caldwell, The Jurisprudence of Thomas Jefferson, 18 IND. L.J. 
193, 205 (1943) (citations omitted). 
144. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427. 
145. Sandefur, supra note 139, at 208. 
146. Id. at 210. 
147. Id. (footnote omitted). 
148. Id. at 215. 
149. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
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Importantly, Coke expressly condemned an early form of 
occupational licensing: mandatory apprenticeships.150  In Allen 
v. Tooley, an upholsterer was sued for failing to fulfill his 
apprenticeship requirement before opening up his practice.151  
Coke, ruling in favor of the upholster, said that he had the right 
“to use any trade thereby to maintain himself and his 
family[.]”152  After his time on the bench, Coke wrote vigorously 
against the imposition of restriction on engaging in trade: “if a 
graunt be made to any man, to have the sole making of cards, or 
the sole dealing with any other trade, that graunt is against the 
liberty and freedom of the subject[.]”153 
2. Jefferson and Contemporaries 
Jefferson put great stock in what Blackstone and Coke 
said.154  As for Jefferson, he wrote: “everyone has a natural right 
to choose for his pursuit such one of them as he thinks most 
likely to furnish him subsistence.”155  In another instance 
Jefferson said: “a wise and frugal Government, which shall 
restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them 
otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and 
improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the 
bread it has earned.”156  Jefferson’s statements should come to 
no surprise, as he was also influenced by the Cato Papers, which 
stated: 
 
[T]he Right of every Man to pursue the natural, 
reasonable, and religious Dictates of his own 
Mind; to think what he will, and act as he thinks, 
provided not to the Prejudice of another; to spend 
his own Money himself, and lay out the Produce of 
 
ENGLAND *47. 
150. See Allen v. Tooley (1782) 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (KB). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. COKE, supra note 149, at *47. 
154. See Caldwell, supra note 143, at 206. 
155. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THOUGHTS ON LOTTERIES (1826), reprinted in 17 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., Definitive 
ed. 1905). 
156. THOMAS JEFFERSON, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1801), reprinted in 
STEPHEN HOWARD BROWNE, JEFFERSON’S CALL FOR NATIONHOOD xv (2003). 
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his Labour his own Way; and to labour for his own 
Pleasure and Profit, and not for others who are 
idle, and would live and riot by pillaging and 
oppressing him, and those that are like him.157 
 
Shortly before Jefferson authored the Declaration of 
Independence, fellow Virginian George Mason wrote that all 
men have certain inherent rights: “the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, 
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”158  James 
Madison, one of Jefferson’s closest friends,159 said that property 
is not secure 
 
where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and 
monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free 
use of their faculties, and free choice of their 
occupations, which not only constitute their 
property in the general sense of the word; but are 
the means of acquiring property strictly so called. 
What must be the spirit of legislation where a 
manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to bury 
his own child in a linen shroud, in order to favour 
his neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; 
where the manufacturer and wearer of woolen 
cloth are again forbidden the []economical use of 
buttons of that material, in favor of the 
manufacturer of buttons of other materials!160 
 
Therefore, “in light of Jefferson’s other influences, it is 
evident that Jefferson’s use of the phrase, ‘life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness,’ was meant to assert this right of 
 
157. CATO, AN ENQUIRY IN THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIBERTY (Letter No. 
62) (1721), reprinted in DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING 
A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 15 (2011).  Importantly, Cato’s Letters were a 
“major influence” on Thomas Jefferson.  Porter v. State, 913 N.W.2d 842, 856 
(2018) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
158. Sandefur, supra note 139, at 220 (quoting ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, 
GEORGE MASON: RELUCTANT STATESMAN 111 (1961) (emphasis added)). 
159. See generally Lee Wilkins, Madison and Jefferson: The Making of a 
Friendship, 12 INT’L SOC’Y POL. PSYCH. 593 (1992). 
160. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792), reprinted in JAMES MADISON: 
WRITINGS 516 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
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livelihood.”161  Finally, another scholar said “that to Jefferson 
liberty as a natural right meant . . . freedom of occupation[.]”162 
3. Post-Jefferson 
Having considered what Jefferson’s predecessors and 
contemporaries thought about whether liberty includes the right 
to earn a living, we can now turn to early cases dealing with the 
topic.  In 1795, in VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, Supreme Court 
Justice Patterson said: “No man would become a member of a 
community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest 
labour and industry . . . [t]he preservation of property then is a 
primary object of the social compact, and, by the later 
Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law.”163  
In another case, Sewall v. Jones, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that “[s]tatutes which impose restrictions upon trade 
or common occupations, or which levy an excise or tax upon 
them, must be construed strictly.”164  That is to say, the court, in 
interpreting the statute, interpreted it in a way that less 
infringes on a party’s liberties. 
The Massachusetts court was not the only court to apply an 
exacting review of economic regulations.  In Alabama, an early 
court went so far as to say that a man could not be deprived of 
his right to pursue a lawful living without a full jury trial.165  The 
list could go on.  However, we defer to the work of Mr. Timothy 
Sandefur, who compiled a list of about sixty reported cases 
discussing the right to earn a living.166  As Mr. Sandefur’s work 
suggests, Lochner did not announce any new, previously 
unknown principle of law.167  It was simply a reaffirmation of 
the norm: the protection of economic rights.  Mr. Sandefur 
argues that it was the 1937 West Coast Hotel decision that “was 
 
161. Sandefur, supra note 139, at 219–20. 
162. Chester James Antieau, Natural Rights and the Founding Fathers-
The Virginians, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43, 64 (1960) (citing Carl Becker, What 
Is Still Living in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?, 48 AM. HIST. 
REV. 691, 695 (1943)). 
163. VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795). 
164. Sewall v. Jones, 26 Mass. (1 Pick) 412, 421 (Mass. 1830). 
165. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 368 (Ala. 1838). 
166. Sandefur, supra note 139, at 225, 263–66 (listing the cases from 
1823-1873 defending the common law right to earn a living). 
167. Id. at 208. 
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the new, ahistorical reading of the law.”168  Thus, while 
Lochner’s conclusion was problematic for a variety of reasons, it 
needs to be understood that West Coast Hotel’s conclusion—that 
economic liberty deserved only minimal protection—was not a 
return to some ancient precedent from which Lochner wandered 
away from.  Therefore, while we do not advocate the revival of 
Lochner, we must also point out that West Coast Hotel is also 
problematic in its own right. 
D. Historical Limitations on the Exercise of a Natural Right 
History supports Ladd’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution’s natural rights clause, as originally understood, 
protects the right to pursue a chosen occupation.169  As such, it 
can provide a valuable litigation blueprint to opponents of 
occupational licensing.  As previously mentioned, Pennsylvania 
is just one of thirty-three such states that contain a natural 
rights clause.170  These natural rights clauses provide an easy 
anchor point by which to argue that occupational licensing 
interferes with one’s “right to pursue a chosen occupation” and, 
consequently, interferes with the rights guaranteed by the state 
constitution’s natural rights clause.  However, it is equally 
important to understand that there are limits on the exercise of 
any natural right. 
Ladd shifts the conversation from whether the right exists to 
how much protection should the right be given.  We do not argue, 
and history does not support the position, that the right to 
pursue a chosen occupation is limitless.  Historically, courts 
have allowed governments to impose regulations to protect 
consumer health and safety.171  Even Ladd recognized that the 
“right to pursue a chosen occupation” is not absolute and can be 
limited to “preserve public health, safety, and welfare.”172  
However, limits on the exercise of a right do not negate the 
existence of the right. 
Moreover, the limits recognized by the court in Ladd—
public health, safety, and welfare—are in accord with the 
 
168. Id. 
169. See supra notes 27–30. 
170. See supra note 39. 
171. See Sandefur, supra note 139, at 213. 
172. Ladd v. Real Estate Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1108 (Pa. 2020). 
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traditional limiting principles on exercising any natural right.  
The founders generally agreed on this principle: “Being equally 
free, individuals did not have a right to infringe the equal rights 
of others, and, correctly understood, even self-preservation 
typically required individuals to cooperate—to avoid doing unto 
others what they would not have others do unto them.”173  That 
is, a person can generally exercise his or her natural rights up 
until the point the exercise of that right harms others.  In other 
words, “natural rights define a private domain within which 
persons may do as they please, provided their conduct does not 
encroach upon the rightful domain of others.”174  We can see this 
limiting principle at work in a very straightforward example.  
For instance, bodily integrity is considered one of the “most 
cherished of rights.”175  But even that right is limited, as certain 
persons can be involuntarily committed if they pose a danger to 
themselves or others.176 
Therefore, not even the founding fathers or their 
predecessors argued for unbridled economic liberty.  Blackstone 
once said: “This natural liberty consists properly in a power of 
acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless 
by the law of nature[.]”177  That is to say, “[t]he natural law 
accepted by these men stood not only for the proposition that 
man is social by his nature, but also that his existence in society 
necessarily imposes limitations upon the enjoyment of his 
natural rights.”178 
Accordingly, even state courts that protect economic 
freedom do not leave that freedom unbridled.  Health and safety 
can often provide valid justification for limiting the exercise of 
these rights, with evidence, for licensing, but quality alone does 
not.  So far, as we are able to discern, there are two predominant 
 
173. Hamburger, supra note 115, at 924 (footnote omitted). 
174. BARNETT, supra note 114, at 58 (emphasis added). 
175. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed 
Bodily Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (2014). 
176. See Standards for Involuntary Commitment (Assisted 
Treatment) State-by-State (Source Treatment Advocacy Center), MENTAL 
ILLNESS POL’Y ORG., https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/national-studies/state-
standards-involuntary-treatment.html (last visited June 5, 2021) (listing 
states containing the statutes for involuntary commitment for health or safety 
reasons). 
177. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, at *125 (emphasis added). 
178. Antieau, supra note 162, at 55. 
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standards state courts apply when reviewing economic 
regulations: “rational basis” and “heightened rational basis 
review.”179  For example, Ladd subjects economic regulations to 
a “heightened rational basis review.”180  However, other states 
subject it to less scrutiny.  For example, in Patel v. Texas 
Department of Licensing and Regulation, commercial eyebrow 
threaders successfully challenged a Texas occupational licensing 
scheme that required them to complete 750 hours of training 
before obtaining their license.181  The court concluded that the 
scheme deprived the challengers of the due process of law 
guaranteed by the Texas Constitution.182  However, in reaching 
that conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court still adhered to the 
standard “rational basis” test, which put the onus on the 
challengers to show that the licensing scheme was “so 
oppressive” that it violated the Texas Constitution.183 
At the end of the day, each state supreme court is more than 
capable of choosing the proper standard demanded by its 
constitution, and it is not our purpose to outline the pros and 
cons of each standard.  Rather, our purpose is to highlight that 
Ladd recognizes a right to pursue a chosen occupation and 
protects that right.  Additionally, no court, other than Ladd, to 
our knowledge, has gone so far as to protect the right to pursue 
a chosen occupation as a natural right.184  However, if other 
courts do, they must confront the reality that natural rights 
arguably deserve more protection than mere civil rights.185  
Accordingly, advocates in those courts can make a compelling 
 
179. This standard goes by many other names as well: “rational basis with 
bite,” “rational basis with teeth,” and “rational basis with economic bite.”  
While the formulation of this test varies depending on the jurisdiction, its 
essential inquiry is: what is the “actual rationality” behind the law and it 
scrutinizes “the law's actual basis[.]” See Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & 
Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 98 (Tex. 2015) (Willet, J., concurring). 
180. Ladd v. Real Est. Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1110 (Pa. 2020). 
181. Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 91 (Tex. 
2015). 
182. Id. at 90. 
183. Id. 
184. In fact, the only other example we could find of a court reaching such 
a conclusion comes from the two dissenting justices in Porter v. State, who 
determined that Wisconsin’s natural rights clause guaranteed an inherent and 
fundamental right to economic liberty.  Porter v. State, 913 N.W.2d 842, 859 
(2018) (Bradley, J. & Kelly, J., dissenting). 
185. See generally Hermansen, supra note 21. 
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argument that economic regulations—such as burdensome 
occupational licensing schemes—which interfere with the right 
to pursue a chosen occupation ought to be viewed with more 
scrutiny, either strict scrutiny186 or the heightened rational basis 
test outlined in Ladd.187  The latter test, as one law professor 
put it: 
 
would require that the legislation at issue actually 
be reasonably related to its legislative purpose, 
and that the purpose be valid.  Such a test would 
allow courts to better protect rights, while at the 
same time retain the benefits of tiered scrutiny as 
it currently exists.  By allowing courts to inquire 
into the purpose behind the legislation and to look 
at the link between the ends and the means, 
courts will no longer have to try to find some way 
around the test in hard cases, and the doctrine 
will become more consistent and legitimate.188 
 
Even if the right to choose one’s occupation is a natural 
right, the government can impose regulations on that right 
where the health and safety of others may be at risk.  For 
instance, licensing requirements may very well be more easily 
justified for medical professions.  It is much harder to justify 
licensing requirements, however, for florists or interior 
designers.  In response, many advocates for occupational 
licensing attempt to justify licensing requirements on the basis 
that licensing can improve the quality of goods and services 
delivered to customers.  However, the health and safety 
justifications are different in kind from quality justifications.  
Each person has a right to not be harmed by another person, but 
people do not have a right to say, a high-quality florist.  So, even 
setting aside the fact that ensuring the quality of goods and 
services is not a justified limitation on a natural right (unless 
the quality directly affects the health and safety of the 
consumer), recent research does not support the position that 
 
186. When a court reviews a law under the strict scrutiny standard the 
law (1) must further a compelling interest; and (2) be narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
187. Ladd v. Real Est. Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 1110 (Pa. 2020). 
188. Jackson, supra note 98, at 493. 
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licensing even increases quality—thereby, undermining this 
secondary justification for licensing.  A report by the White 
House Council of Economic Advisors under the Obama 
Administration, along with Department of the Treasury and 
Department of Labor, found that licensing generally neither 
improves quality nor health and safety: “With the caveats that 
the literature focuses on specific examples and that quality is 
difficult to measure, most research does not find that licensing 
improves quality or public health and safety.”189  A review of the 
nineteen empirical studies on the subject shows that 84% of 
studies show occupational licensing to have a neutral or negative 
effect on the quality of goods and services provided; the 
remaining three studies, which showed positive effects on 
quality, were specific to professions in the medical field or to the 
policy of reciprocal licensing between states.190 
E. The Limitations of Ladd-type Litigation 
While natural rights clauses may appear to provide an easy 
opportunity for litigants challenging occupational licensing, they 
are likely to run into a potential obstacle—a catch-22 situation.  
The “conservative” judges who are generally the most likely to 
be eager to restrict burdensome occupational licensing 
regulations, might be the most hesitant to find unenumerated 
natural rights in their own state constitutions.  That is to say, 
by using a natural rights clause to protect unenumerated rights, 
these judges are likely cognizant of the risk opening up a 
Pandora’s box: the use of these clauses can evolve into mini-
substantive due process fonts where “new” rights can be 
discovered whenever the bench decides to go looking for them.  
Justice Antonin Scalia said the way the federal court interprets 
substantive due process causes it to effectively operate as a 
“mere springboard[] for judicial lawmaking.”191  As one law 
professor put it: “Many scholars have discussed natural law and 
natural rights, and often they have employed these ideas to 
claim the existence of unwritten constitutional rights or to claim 
 
189. DEPT. OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 9, at 13. 
190. See McLaughlin et al., supra note 18, at 29–31 tbl. 3. 
191. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25 (2d. ed., 2018). 
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that constitutional rights should be expansively defined.”192  In 
part for this reason, legislation has to date been the most obvious 
approach to reducing unjustified occupational licensing 
regulations. 
While it remains to be seen how successful this method will 
be, Ladd does ultimately represent a new approach for litigation 
which may open the door for larger scale reforms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Arbitrary occupational licensing regulations have increased 
over the last sixty years due to a rapid expansion in 
requirements and anti-competitive rent-seeking behavior by 
professional associations and others.  Sara Ladd, the litigant in 
the Ladd case, is not alone in having to face down a burdensome 
occupational licensing scheme.  In 2009, Ash Patel moved from 
India to Texas to begin his own version of the American Dream: 
opening a small eyebrow threading salon.193  However, Texas 
required him to obtain an expensive cosmetology license and 
training (that taught very little about eyebrow threading).194  
Mr. Patel shut down his business and went to court where, six 
litigation-filled years later, he eventually regained his right to 
operate his business.195  Ms. Ladd and Mr. Patel are fortunate, 
and they are among the few that have won court cases of this 
kind.  Yet, there remains hundreds of professions across the 
United States harnessed with unjustified barriers to entry, 
imposing massive economic costs that fall disproportionately on 
the shoulders of those least positioned to afford them. 
However, progress is being made. Legislative reform, while 
slow to date due to the local nature of licensing laws, has 
received bipartisan support.  But until such time as legislative 
reform is widespread, persons like Ms. Ladd and Mr. Patel will 
likely need to resort to legal challenges as the most direct route 
for tackling the immense burdens imposed by unjustified 
occupational licensing. 
 
192. Hamburger, supra note 115, at 907. 
193. Ash Patel, INST. FOR JUST. (Dec. 8, 2009), https://ij.org/client/ash-
patel/. 
194. Id. 
195. See generally Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 
69, 69 (Tex. 2015). 
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We believe Ladd provides a compelling example of 
successful state court litigation in this area.  Ladd recognized a 
natural right to pursue a chosen occupation, therefore calling 
into question the legitimacy of restrictions to that right—
namely, it calls into question the legitimacy of unjustified 
occupational licensing which restrict the exercise of that right. 
Ladd’s holding is not some far-fetched decision with no basis in 
the law.  The founding fathers clearly identified the freedom to 
choose one’s occupation as an essential component of the right to 
pursue happiness, a position firmly founded on the English 
common law tradition as interpreted by Blackstone and Coke.  
Opinions of U.S. courts in the nineteenth century largely 
reinforced such an interpretation.  Ladd simply recognizes that 
this right is protected by the natural rights clause of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.  This recognition is especially 
relevant for the thirty-three states with identical or 
substantially similar natural rights clauses in their respective 
constitutions whose courts may be inclined to follow Ladd’s 
example.  It remains to be seen what impact Ladd may have in 
Pennsylvania and if it will lead to a more systematic review of 
all occupational licensing in the state.  If courts recognize the 
right to pursue a chosen occupation as a natural right, courts 
will be forced to confront the fact that natural rights, by their 
status as such, deserve a substantial amount of protection.196  
Thus, Ladd could potentially signal the beginning of a period of 
increased judicial scrutiny over occupational licensing 
regulations and compliment the positive bipartisan trend in 
state legislative reforms by systematically challenging those 
occupational licensing requirements which are anti-competitive 
and which lack proper justification. 
 
 
196. See Hermansen, supra note 21. 
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